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Berns: The Home Office Deduction: Administrative Complexity versus Taxpa

NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION:
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY VERSUS
TAXPAYER EQUITY
The employee home office expense deduction' of today bears
only a slight resemblance to its ancestor of a few years ago. Repeated litigation has modified and revised the nature of the deduction at such a rapid pace that even the Internal Revenue
2
Service's attempted solidification of the home office deduction
was destined to enjoy a relatively short life before suffering the
erosive effects of litigation. In 1973, as a part of this ongoing
process of refinement, the Tax Court in Stephen A. Bodzin3 and
George W. Gino4 made dramatic changes in the standards used
to allow the home office deduction.- The changes have given birth
to serious legislative concern which looms as a threat to the advances made by these cases.' Barring any legislative action, however, the impact of these cases should be to herald an increased
workload for the Internal Revenue Service in the name of taxpayer equity.
I.

THE DEDUCTION

Under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 a taxpayer is permitted to deduct all the "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses he incurs in carrying on his "trade or business."' The expenses may not be personal in nature.' However,
1. This article focuses on the home office expense deduction of employees and not
on the similar deduction available to the self-employed individual. Hereinafter, all references to the home office deduction shall be understood to mean the deduction that may
be taken by an employee. See note 14 infra.
2. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cuat. BULL. 52 [hereinafter also referred to as Revenue
Ruling 62-180].
3. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1397, 4th Cir., Apr. 4, 1974.
4. 60 T.C. 304 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 21, 1974.
5. See the discussions of the Bodzin case in the text accompanying notes 92-98, 14056 infra and of the Gino case in the text accompanying notes 130-39, 157-58 infra.
6. See notes 159, 163 infra, where a proposal of the House Ways and Means Committee [hereinafter cited as Committee Proposal] for the deduction's legislative reform
(which heretofore has not been reported out of committee) is set forth and discussed. A
copy of the Committee Proposal is on file at the offices of the Hofstra Law Review.
7. INT. REV. ConE OF 1954, § 162(a) [INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 hereinafter also cited as
Code].
8. § 162 of the Code states in relevant part:
(a) In general.
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quite often expenses are incurred by the taxpayer that serve both
substantial personal and business motives.'0 In such instances the
Code allows the taxpayer to allocate that portion of the total
expenses that is attributable to business use to arrive at the proper deduction.1
The home office expense deduction is an example of this
legislative grace. 12 Many employees 3 use a portion of their homes
to conduct a part of their work for their employers." If they are
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
9. INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, § 262; Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(a) (1958). See Challenge Mfg.
Co., 37 T.C. 650 (1962); Henry C. Smith, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 113 F.2d
114 (2d Cir. 1940). Apparently the deduction will be allowed even if the expenses are partly
personal in nature, as long as the expenses are primarily for business purposes. United
Aniline Co. v. Comm'r, 316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953); Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C.
463 (1955). The fact that there may at times be purely personal use is not determinative.
Simons Brick Co., 14 B.T.A. 878 (1928), afl'd, 45 F.2d 57 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
283 U.S. 834 (1931); cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 274 (a)(1)(B); Tress. Reg. § 1.274-2
(e)(4) (1963).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3)(1958). See, e.g., George W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973),
appeal docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 21, 1974.
11. Clarence J. Sapp, 36 T.C. 852 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 309 F.2d 143 (5th Cir.
1962); Hal E. Roach Studios, 20 B.T.A. 917 (1930).
12. Indeed, all "[dieductions are a matter of grace and Congress can, of course,
disallow them as it chooses." Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
13. Walter Cronkite does it behind closed doors. Grace Mirabella, the editor of Vogue, does it in a bedroom closet. Everett Fahy, the director of the Frick,
does it under a seventeenth century printing of a madonna. And I'm doing it in
the guest room as I write. Homework! Everybody's doing it. Part time. Overtime. Some time.
NEw YoRK MAGAZE, Apr. 22, 1974, at 49.
14. The home office deduction discussed herein is determined by the interplay of §§
162 and 262 of the Code. See Staller, The Second Office as Home, 58 A.B.A.J. 526 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Staller]. See also Trees. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3)(1958).
For a creative, if not radical, approach to the problems posed by the home office
question as well as related problems involving § 162 and § 262 allocations see Halperin,
Business Deductions for PersonalLiving Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved
Problem, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 859 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Approach]. Professor Halperin sets forth the thesis that if expenditures by an individual yield personal
satisfaction or benefits, that degree of satisfaction or benefits should somehow be reflected
by an increased gross income to the taxpayer. He expands on this notion and states:
An indirect way of taxing these benefits is to deny a deduction to the extent
personal satisfaction has been obtained from the expenditure. If satisfaction
were equal to cost, this approach would suggest complete disallowance.
Id. at 863.
Professor Halperin suggests four factors which should be considered in determining
whether or not a particular expenditure can reasonably be expected to equal the derivative
satisfaction from the expenditure:
1. The degree of certainty as to the business benefit to be obtained.
2. The degree of certainty as to the existence of personal enjoyment.
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able to overcome some hurdles of proof,15 they are entitled to
claim the expense of running that portion of the home as a deduction when computing taxable income.18 All the expenses attributable to the home office are allowed." These may include rent" (for
the taxpayer who rents his home), depreciation, 9 mortgage inter22
est,"0 and real property taxes2 (for the home owner), telephone,
heat,2" electricity,2 insurance,2 cleaning2' and repairs. 27 It is not
necessary that the portion be exclusively used for business purposes. 2 A taxpayer may qualify for the deduction even if the
portion of the residence is also regularly used by the taxpayer and
his family for personal pleasures. 21 It is not necessary that the
portion of the residence sought to be claimed as a home office be
a well defined area." Indeed, taxpayers have successfully claimed
3. The possibility of both business and personal satisfaction from the same
expenditure.
4. Payment of the individual benefitted or by another party.
Id. at 887 (footnote omitted).
15. See text accompanying notes 43-54 infra.
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 63(a), 162(a).
17. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-(1)(a)(1958) and 1.262-(1)(b)(3)(1958).
18. Ray Harroun, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 780 (1945).
19. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52, 53.
20. Id.
21. Bevan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1973), aff'g 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1337
(1971).
22. Donald W. Fausner, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mei. 1248 (1971), aff'd without discussion
on this point, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973), aft'd, 413 U.S. 838 (1973); Harry Bennett, 27
CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 365 (1968). See Frank Vesey, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 74,163
(June 24, 1974); Theodore E. Lockabey, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 74,100 (Apr.
23, 1974).
23. Alsen E. Inman, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 1168 (1970).
24. Fiorentino v. Comm'r, 455 F.2d 1406 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1445 (1970).
25. Richard E. Benson, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 1555 (1968). See Frank Vesey, P-H
TAx CT. REP. & MEss. DEC. 74,163 (June 24, 1974).
26. Louis Lindauer, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 715 (1956).
27. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cumi. BULL. 53. Repair expenses are allocable to the home
office on the basis of the expense's actual application to the home office. In addition, the
taxpayer is allowed to include a pro rata portion of painting the outside of his house or
repairing the roof. However, "[e]xpenditures for lawn care, landscaping, etc., are not
deductible." Id. The employee is apparently discriminated against by such policy. For
examples of other ways in which employees are discriminated against under our tax
system see 47 INDIANA L.J. 546 (1971).
28. See text accompanying notes 113-39 infra for a discussion of exclusivity of business use of the home office. See also notes 159, 163 infra.
29. However, he must be able to show that the business use of the office is "regular"
as well. See text accompanying notes 67-75 infra. Furthermore, the taxpayer in this situation will be faced with the task of computing a home office expense that somehow reflects
the business use of the home office as a percentage of the total use of the home office.
This problem is discussed in the text accompanying notes 113-39 infra.
30. The courts have treated most favorably those taxpayers whose claimed home
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parts of rooms, 31 garages, 32 basements, 33 alcoves 34 and even a dining room table35 as constituting home offices. The deduction is
indiscriminately granted to employees who work in such fields as
law, 3 accounting, 37 education, 38 and g6vernmental service" as
well as to those who pursue more exotic professions such as gam42
4
blers,4" inventors ' and entertainers.
II.

THE TAXPAYER'S BURDEN OF PROOF

The taxpayer has the burden4 3 of meeting three requirements
in order to qualify for the home office deduction." First, he must
establish that the portion claimed as an office was actually used
in carrying on a "trade or business." 5 Second, he must prove that
the home office was "regularly" used in pursuit of business activities.4" Third, he must establish that the maintenance of the home
office was "appropriate and helpful" to his business.4" A failure
to meet any one of these standards could result in a total disallowance of the deduction.
offices are well defined areas, however. This probably owes to the taxpayer's burden of
substantiation and the Cohan hurdle discussed in the text accompanying notes 49-54
infra, and not the merit of the claimed deduction.
31. Demor, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1496 (1968).
32. Richard Haman, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 466 (1972).
33. Walter W. Hendrix, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 221 (1971).
34. Fiorentino v. Comm'r, 455 F.2d 1406 (2d Cir. 1971), affig 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1445 (1970).
35. George W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th Cir., Mar.
21, 1974.
36. Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1397, 4th Cir.,
Apr. 4, 1974.
37. Spencer D. Lorton, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mei. 566 (1953).
38. 60 T.C. 304 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 21, 1974.
39. See JOINT COMmTrEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENT

NIXON'S TAX Rxrums (1969-1972), S. Rep. No. 93-768, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as NIxoN's TAXES].

40. Harry Bennett, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 365 (1968); Louis Cohen, 27 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 243 (1958).
41. William Tiffin Downs, 49 T.C. 533 (1968).
42. Madge H. Evans, 8 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 164 (1939).
43. TAX CT. R. PpAc. 32.

44. Cf. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 52, 53:
The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish (1) that, as a condition
of his employment, he is required to provide his own space and facilities for
performance of some of his duties, (2) that he regularly uses a part of his personal residence for that purpose, (3) the portion of his personal residence which
is so used, (4) the extent of such use, and (5) the pro rata portion of the deprecia.
tion and expenses for maintaining his residence which is properly attributable
to such use.
45. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). See text accompanying notes 55-66 infra.
46. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52. See text accompanying notes 67-75 infra.
47. See text accompanying notes 76-103 infra.
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If the taxpayer has met these requirements he will be entitled
to a deduction for the expenses of running the home office." However, the deduction that will be allowed by the Internal Revenue
Service will probably be less than the deduction claimed by the
taxpayer unless a further standard of substantiation is met. The
Cohan rule49 allows the taxpayer a deduction for expenses where
it is obvious that deductible expenses have been incurred but are
not substantiated. 0 But it also dictates that since the amount51 of
the claimed expense in such a case is only an approximation of
the true expense, that approximation may " . . . bear heavily
upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making." ' It
is therefore advisable that the taxpayer be able to provide proper
53 so that he will
and adequate documentation of his expenses
54
qualify for the full deduction allowable.
A.

Trade or Business

Although the use of the term "trade or business" pervades
the Code, it is never defined.55 Consequently, the task of definition has belonged to the courts. 6 Its meaning in the context of §
48. Cf. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cura. BuLL. 52. See note 44 supra.

49. Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
50. Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the majority, said "to allow nothing at all
appears to us inconsistent with saying something was spent." Id. at 544.

51. Id. at 543.
52. Id. at 543-44.
53. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-17(d)(2), (3)(1959). Although these sections focus on the
degree of substantiation required for an employee who must prove expense account expenditures, the types of things suggested to taxpayers are applicable to the home office
area as well. An accurate record of bills paid and supporting documentary proof will prove
invaluable to the taxpayer claiming the home office deduction. See Crumbly, Courts Are
Changing Current Tax Climate on Office At Home Deduction, 31 J. TAX. 300 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Crumbly].
54. Where substantiation is inadequate only a portion of the claimed deduction may
be allowed. Compare Stanley E. Bailey, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 460 (1971) and John
Michael Hayes, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 393 (1967). Indeed, courts have even disallowed
the entire claimed deduction, in defiance of Cohan, where the substantiation is totally
lacking. Paul J. O'Connell, P-H TAx CT. REP. &MEM. DEC. 74,128 (May 14, 1974); Henry
M. Rodney, 53 T.C. 287 (1969); Raymond Schott, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1648 (1964).
55. See Groh, "Trade or Business". What It Means, What It Is and What It Is Not,
26 J. TAx. 78 (1967).
56. See Berswanger, Factors Used By the Courts to Determine What is a Trade or
Business for Tax Purposes, 4 TAXATON FOR AccouNTArs 178 (1969).
57. However, when the home office expense is claimed by a self-employed individual
rather than an employee, the question of whether a legitimate § 162 expense has been
incurred can be troublesome. For instance, if the self-employed taxpayer claims as business expenses activities which are generally considered to be personal in nature, these
expenses may be disallowed unless the taxpayer can clearly show that the expense served
business purposes. Louis Greenspon, 23 T.C. 138 (1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956);
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162 may only be gleaned by reference to the apposite case law and
its application to the given factual situation.
In the home office area, it is relatively easy to gauge whether
or not the trade or business requirement has been met. 7 Rarely
is the business nature of the claimed deduction an issue. 8 It is
sufficient that the employee-taxpayer does work at home. The
employee is considered to be in the "business" of being an employee or of earning his pay." Thus, any work done by an employee reasonably related" to his work as an employee falls within
the trade or business concept of § 162. Naturally, the expenses
claimed as business expenses must indeed be related to his work
and must not primarily further personal goals.' The link must be
strong between the activity claimed to be part of the employee's
2
work and the employee's duties.
The taxpayer, although satisfying the above requirements,
might not meet the trade or business requirement if he had a right
of reimbursement against his employer which he failed to exercise 3 or if the employer would have originally paid the expense
as his own, had the employee so requested.64 The rationale behind
this is, clearly, that in these instances the expenses are considered
to be the obligations of the employer.65 To allow the employee a
cf. Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); see also C. Harry Blunt, 25 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1445 (1966); Russell McCaulley, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 12 (1964). An activity
must clearly look more like a business than a hobby for a taxpayer to qualify for the
deduction. Mayrath v. Comm'r, 357 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'g 41 T.C. 582 (1964); cf.
Richard L. Malter, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 459 (1967). Additionally, the taxpayer must
establish that the activities engaged in were contemplated to show an eventual profit
(William Tiffin Downs, 49 T.C. 533 (1968)) and were not merely preparatory to engaging
in a trade or business (Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969)). This expectation must be
realistic. William Tiffin Downs, supra.
58. 47 INDiANA L.J. 546, 547 (1971).
59. Fisher v. United States, 490 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1973); Folker v. Johnson, 230 F.2d
906 (2d Cir. 1956); Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219 (1972) (Drennan, J., concurring);
Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CUM. BuLL. 52; Note, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 700, 706-07 (1974). See
also NIxoN's TAXES, supra note 39 at 123.
60. 47 INDIANA L.J. 546, 557 (1971). See note 146 infra.
61. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
62. See, e.g., Stanley T. Yascolt, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 55 (1971) (petitioner's claim
that he used his residence for the business purpose of entertaining customers and therefore
was entitled to a rental expense deduction was disallowed because he could not establish
that the entertaining was part of his business as is required by § 274(a)(1)(B) of the Code
and Tress. Reg. § 1.274-2(e)(4)(iii)(1964).
63. Horace E. Podems, 24 T.C. 21 (1955); Eugene J. Rogers, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
749 (1959).
64. Noland v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1959); Heidt v. Comm'r, 274 F.2d 25
(7th Cir. 1959).
65. Leonard E. Austin, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Meri. 125 (1962).
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deduction for paying the expenses of another would be anomalous.6"
B.

Regular Use

The requirement that the use of the home office must be
"regular" 6 7 is vague. Nowhere in the Code or the Income Tax
Regulations is there an explicit definition of "regular." 8 Only
through an examination of what is not considered to be "regular"
may an understanding of the word be molded.
The Internal Revenue Service in Revenue Ruling 62-180 gives
an example of the type of use of part of one's home that would
fail as a home office because the work carried on therein was not
"regular": 9
Occasionally, [the employee] is unable to complete [his required work] by the close of business and finds it necessary to
work on it after hours. Since the corporation's offices are closed
to employees after six o'clock, he takes [his required work]
home and works on it at a desk in his den.
Since the business use of the den is incidental and occasional
rather than regular, the expenses of maintaining his residence
which are allocable to the occasionaluse of the den for business
purposes are, therefore, not ordinary and necessary business
expenses and are not deductible.
Unfortunately, the example given as an attempt to define regular
is of little help, since "occasional" is defined circularly. Clarification of the "incidental" concept is never even approached in the
ruling.
The taxpayer need not be a clairvoyant, however, to deter66. See Dodd v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 570, 578 (4th Cir. 1962); Deputy v. du Pont, 308
U.S. 488 (1940). See also Brown v. Comm'r, 446 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1971).
§ 25.12. Expenses Incurred for Another's Benefit.
...the general rule is that for an expense to be deductible as a business
expense it must be paid or incurred in connection with the carrying on of a trade
or business of the taxpayer. Implicit therein is the assumption that if the expense is paid or incurred by the taxpayer in connection with the carrying on of
a trade or business of someone else, such expense is generally not deductible
by anyone, even though the taxpayer receives a benefit from incurring such
expense.
4AMErrENs, LAW oF FEDERAL INCOMETAXAION § 25.12 at 75-76 (1972) (citations omitted).

67. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CUM. BuLL. 52-57. The "regular" requirement is the only
one of the three existing requirements that has no basis in § 162 of the Code. Proposed
legislation would remedy this. See note 159 infra at § 280(c)(1).
68. The "regular" concept is probably an extension of the requirement that expenses
must fall closer to the dictates of § 162 of the Code than to § 262 to be deductible. See
Staller, supra note 14.
69. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 52, 57 (emphasis added).
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mine whether the work in the home office is "regular" enough to
qualify him for the deduction.7" The case law has established
some guides for the taxpayer to follow that appear to be concrete.
The taxpayer must be able to show that his use of the office is
ongoing and of a continuous nature.7" Evidence that tends to show
that the employee has abandoned working at home may result in
a denial of the deduction.7" The "regular" requirement, however,
seems to be in question very seldom; the threshold that must be
passed is low.73 The taxpayer will apparently qualify for the deduction if the home office is used at least two hours per week75
night, 74 or ten hours per week.
C. Appropriate and Helpful
The third requirement, that the home office be "appropriate
and helpful" in carrying on the taxpayer's trade or business, is
the most interesting one. Its recent emergence as a liberal interpretation of the Code's "ordinary and necessary" requirement in
the home office deduction area has been slow, indicating a cautious reluctance by the courts to accept it as the proper construction of "ordinary and necessary.""8 The adoption in Stephen A.
70. Presumably, the taxpayer should qualify for the deduction regardless of regularity
of use, however the term "regular" is ultimately defined. See note 67 supra and the
discussion of the Cohan rule in the text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
71. Harcourt M. Stebbins, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 823 (1971).
72. Glendale 0. Scott, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 835 (1968).
73. The courts have allowed a home office deduction even where the taxpayer was
able to show "a minimal use of his home for business purposes." Lyndol L. Young, 26 PH Tax Ct. Mem. 856 (1957), aff'd, 268 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1959). Apparently, a home office
deduction will be allowed if the expense is slightly less than five percent of the total
expenses of the home. Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820 (1973) ($100 of $2100 in rental
expenses was claimed and allowed as a deduction). But see dissenting opinion of Judge
Featherston in Bodzin, id. at 827-28.
74. George W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th Cir., Mar.
21, 1974.
75. Hoggard v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 5805 (E.D. Va. 1967). It is
possible that with the adoption of a very low "appropriate and helpful" standard (see text
accompanying notes 92-103 infra) the requirement of "regular" use may fall by the wayside: a determination that the home office was "appropriate and helpful" would seem to
render a finding that the work was not "regular" meaningless.
76. An earlier case, Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1971), echoed
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933), and held that in the home office area, the
Code's "ordinary and necessary" requirement would be met if the office was "appropriate
and helpful" to the taxpayer's business. The case was, however, of little value in setting
a standard as the term "appropriate and helpful" was not well defined but was merely
used by the court in its decision. It may be implied from the facts of Dietrich that the
court used "appropriate and helpful" in the same way an earlier court used "appropriate."
See the discussion of the Bischoff case in the text accompanying notes 79-81 infra.
Welch v. Heluering, defined "ordinary" to mean that the claimed deduction be an
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Bodzin77 of an extremely low "appropriate and helpful" standard
effectively vitiated the portion of Revenue Ruling 62-180 which
states: 8
[a]n employee who, as a condition of his employment is required to provide his own space and facilities for performance
of his duties. . . may deduct a pro rata portion of the expenses
of maintenance and depreciation on his residence.
The process of vitiation that ended with Bodzin, began in
Herman E. Bischoff.79 The taxpayer, Bischoff, was a commercial
artist who worked overtime in a home office even though his
regular studio was available to him after hours. Although the
establishment of a home office was not a condition of Bischoff's
employment, his employer expected him to establish one. The
court allowed the home office deduction on the grounds that "it
was appropriate to the conduct of his trade of business." 80 Yet the
holding of Bischoff disturbed Revenue Ruling 62-180 only slightly
because of the unique circumstances of the case. The establishment of Bischoff's home office was "appropriate" because the
temperature of his regular office after normal hours made it very
undesirable for him to work there overtime.8" Thus, the Bischoff
court's adoption of the "appropriate" criterion was not a significant departure from the Code's "ordinary and necessary" language. Bischoff's home office was "appropriate" because in that
case it was "necessary" for him to establish a home office in order
to complete the work expected of him. Nevertheless, Bischoff did
erode a portion of the ruling by examining the "condition of employment" requirement from the standpoint of it being "appropriate."
The next case to pick up the "condition of employment"
expense that is consistent with normal business practices and is non-capital. A later case,
Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S 687 (1966) narrowed the "ordinary" concept to only include
all expenses which are non-capital. Indeed, in the home office area taxpayers have unsuccessfully negotiated the "ordinary" hurdle because the expense claimed as a deduction
was capital. See, e.g., Wilbur F. Bolin, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 62 (1967). In the overwhelming number of home office cases, however, the problem does not center around the
expense's capital or non-capital nature but rather centers around whether the expense was
"necessary." The "appropriate and helpful" standard is, thus, more properly viewed as a
descendent of the "necessary" requirement than the "ordinary" dictate of the Code.
77. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1397, 4th Cir., Apr. 4, 1974.
78. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 52 (emphasis added).
79. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1966).
80. Id. at 539.
81. The petitioner claimed that after 6 P.M. the air conditioning and heating systems
functioned inefficiently making it very unpleasant to work overtime at the office.
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question was Newi v. Commissioner.2 The taxpayer, Newi, was
in the business of selling television time. He worked at home
during the evenings by watching television. His employer did not
require him to establish a home office. His claimed home office
deduction was, however, allowed. Although Judge Moore, speaking for the Second Circuit, did not say that his decision rested
upon the grounds that the home office was "appropriate and
helpful" to Newi's business, the decision is best understood if
viewed in that light.13 Presumably, Newi's three to six hours per
night of television viewing made him a more effective salesman;
the work done in the home office helped his business. The Newi
court flatly rejected the "condition of employment" dictate of
Revenue Ruling 62-180 by allowing a home office deduction that
proved to be "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer in his
trade or business but was not required as a condition of his employment.84
Newi is important for another reason. Since Newi's regular
office was available to him at all times, the establishment of a
home office apparently served a personal motive of convenience
to some degree. Although the court did not deal directly with the
issue of convenience, the facts of the case85 illustrate that the
82. 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686 (1969), noted in 47
INDIANA

L.J. 546 (1971).

83. The court allowed the deduction, saying "[i]t would be hard to imagine a better
method than, in the isolation of his study-den, to view, ponder over and make notes
relating to television programs." 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum). The Tax
Court did, however, use the "appropriate and helpful" language. 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.

686, 691 (1969).
84. This result was based upon the court's application of Tellier to the
home office context. Since Tellier redefined "ordinary" to mean non-capital,

thus eliminating the focus on the business practices of the taxpayer's employer,
the sole criterion for deductibility after Tellier is the "appropriateness and
helpfulness" of the expense to the taxpaying employee.
47 INDIANA L.J. 546, 665 (1971) (footnotes omitted). See note 76 supra.

85. It is possible that the Newi court might have been lax in its failure to squarely
face the convenience issue, as such a consideration is apparently mandated by Revenue

Ruling 62-180. Yet, the court did consider the convenience issue to some degree. Judge
Moore, for the majority, reasoned that it would have been "wholly impractical" for Newi
to have gone back to the office after dinner at home because he would have had to hail a

cab at theater hour and travel against untimed traffic lights, through hectic traffic to his
office, possibly missing important TV shows in the process. 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir.
1970). Presumably, Newi had the option of using a faster means of transportation than a
taxi-cab back to his office, such as a subway; he might also have eaten dinner at his office

if he had so chosen and not returned home until later in the evening. He chose to do
neither. Thus, it may be concluded that the home office was established because it was
more convenient for Newi to do his work there than at his regular office. Considering the
pains the court took to discuss the woes of the intra-city commuter, it is difficult to come
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mere existence of convenience as a motive in establishing a home
office does not invalidate the deduction." The Newi court recognized, albeit implicitly, that convenience should be only one area
of focus in determining whether a home office is helpful and not
simply a factor that will serve automatically to deny the deduction. s"
Unlike the situation in Bischoff, it is clear that the taxpayer's
home office work in Newi was voluntary. Arguably, a finding that
the home office work is "appropriate and helpful" moots the
question of whether the deduction should be allowed if it is voluntary. 8 Yet the Commissioner was concerned that Newi "opens the
door for a business deduction to any employee who would voluntarily engage in an activity which conceivably is helpful to his
employer's business. 8 9 The Commissioner not only had trouble
accepting the idea that Newi's evening work was "appropriate
and helpful" to his business but was obviously concerned that
even if it was "appropriate and helpful," the deduction should
not be allowed because the work was of a voluntary nature. 0 He
feared that many more people than had previously claimed the
deduction would now be able to do so.91
It was to be but a relatively short time before the Commisto the conclusion the the Newi court did not consider the convenience issue at all, although
it allowed the deduction on the fact that the commuting might have caused the taxpayer
to do his job less efficiently by missing some TV shows.
86. International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94, 108 (1970); Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 685 (1971); Freda W. Sandrich, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 236 (1946),
supplemental opinion, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 490 (1946); Ray Harroun, 4 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 780 (1945). But cf. Valentine J. Anzalone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 497 (1964). See
also Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cuai. BuLL.52.
87. 47 INDIANA L.J. 546, 547 (1971).
88. Earlier courts were disturbed by the concept of voluntary work and disallowed
the deduction where it was found that the home office work was voluntary. See, e.g.,
Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962), vacated by stipulationand remanded, No. 18188,
9th Cir., Jan. 3, 1964. Others seemed uncomfortable with even approaching the concept
and shied away from examining the "voluntary" issue. See Demor, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem.1496 (1968). Arguably the "voluntary" question as well as the convenience issue is
centered around the "appropriate" portion of the "appropriate and helpful" construction
of "necessary." See note 76 supra. However, a court has yet to handle the "voluntary" or
"convenience" points in such fashion.
89. Brief for Respondent (Commissioner) at 11-12, Newi v. Comm'r, 432 F.2d 998 (2d
Cir. 1970). The court did little to quell the Commissioner's fears, remarking whimsically
that Newi only "opens the door just long enough to enable this Taxpayer to pass through
it into his cloistered study to pursue his business." Id. at 1000.
90. See Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 52, 56.
91. The Commissioner's fears could have been based upon the notion that voluntary
use might lead to a wasteful duplication of facilities, but no such rationale was proposed.
This "duplication of facilities" argument was unsuccessfully made a bit later in LeRoy
W. Gillis, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 429 (1973).
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sioner's fear would be realized. In Stephen A. Bodzin"2 a home
office deduction was allowed where the taxpayer, an Internal Revenue Service attorney, voluntarily maintained a home office
where he did legal reading to keep his knowledge of the tax laws
current.9 3 The "petitioner was not required, requested, expected
or encouraged to work after normal working hours."94 The office
was voluntarily maintained by the taxpayer because it helped
him to execute more effectively his duties as a tax lawyer working
for the government.15 Bodzin found it "desirable" to do his overliked to use evenings and weekends
time work and in fact ...
92. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1397, 4th Cir., Apr. 4, 1974.
93. It was allowed, but not without three vigorous dissents. Judge Scott (Drennan &
Featherston, Jj., concurring) argued against Bodzin's claimed deduction on the grounds
that most anyone who was interested in their work and did reading in the home as a result
of this interest would now qualify for the deduction. 60 T.C. 820, 827 (1973).
Judge Featherston (Drennen, J., concurring) argued that Bodzin's deduction should
be disallowed for two reasons. First, he did not feel that the petitioner incurred any
expenses in carrying on a trade or business. Rejecting the majority opinion, he wrote:
[I]t is beside the point that petitioner's overtime work or his use of his home
office was appropriate and helpful to the performance of his duties as an attorney for the Internal Revenue Service. That is not the issue. The question is
whether the rental expenses were paid or incurred in carrying on petitioner's
business. And there is nothing to show that he would not have incurred these
same rental expenses (or that his rent would have been less) if he had found it
more convenient to do his overtime work at the office provided and maintained
for that purpose by his employer.
60 T.C. 820, 827 (1973). This first reason does not ring true; actual use of the facility
apparently is the determinative criterion. George W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973), appeal
docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 21, 1974; International Artists, Inc., 55 T.C. 94
(1970); accord, Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(e)(4)(1963). Judge Featherston's second reason for
opposing the deduction was that Bodzin's use of the home office was incidental to his
business. However, there is authority to support a finding that Bodzin did meet the regular
requirement. See Hoggard v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 5805 (E.D. Va. 1967)
(petitioner worked at home about 10 to 15 hours per week). See text accompanying notes
67-75 supra.
Judge Quealy (Drennan, J., concurring) could not accept Bodzin's deduction as constituting an "ordinary and necessary" business expense. Stating what conceivably could
be construed as a new test that taxpayers desiring to claim the home office deduction
should meet, he commented:
I would require as a minimum proof on the part of the taxpayer that the
space claimed to have been devoted to this purpose in the residence of the
taxpayer would not have been acquired except for such purposes.
60 T.C. 820, 829 (1973) (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 822.
95. The "voluntary" issue was handled in a most curious manner in Bodzin. The
Commissioner made the argument that the expense incurred in maintaining a home office
was actually an expense of Bodzin's employer which he voluntarily assumed and therefore
was not deductible by Bodzin. The court rejected this argument, saying "that petitioner
had no right to reimbursement for such expenses and, consequently, he did not voluntarily
assume them." Id. But cf. note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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to read widely about current developments in the tax law."9
Bodzin clearly marks an even greater relaxation of the "ordinary and necessary" requirement than did Newi. A home office
deduction may now be allowed where the home office's establishment is possibly only a reflection of the taxpayer's interest in his
work. The door the Commissioner feared had been opened by
Newi was ripped from its hinges by Bodzin. Thus, the "ordinary
and necessary" requirement of the Code is now interpreted to
establish a very low "appropriate and helpful" threshold for the
taxpayer seeking the home office deduction.
Apparently, the only time the taxpayer will be denied the
deduction when the "appropriate and helpful" standard (and
naturally the trade or business and regular use requirements) has
been met is in those instances where convenience is the predominant motive in establishing the home office. 7 Yet Bodzin fails to
explain how the convenience restriction is to be gauged. While the
Newi court implicitly recognized that convenience is often times
an element in determining what is "appropriate and helpful," the
Bodzin decision contemplates that convenience is an issue that
must withstand analysis on its own. The Bodzin court said:98
[a] finding that the home office was simply for the taxpayer's
personal convenience would bar the deduction if the Court concluded that personal convenience was the primary reason for
maintaining the office.
The restriction of convenience presumably operates to prevent a wasteful duplication of facilities.9 Yet, in most cases a
duplication in the home office deduction area is not wasteful but,
to the contrary, increases the taxpayer's efficiency. For instance,
the establishment of a home office reduces commutation time in
the cases where a person might ordinarily go home for dinner and
then return to his regular office in the evening.' A home office
96. 60 T.C. 820, 822 (1973) (emphasis added).
97. The court also pointed out that the home office deduction will be disallowed if it
is found that the taxpayer "sought only to manufacture a deduction." Id. at 826. What
the court meant by this is not clear. If it intended by the statement to disallow all home
office deductions where there in fact was no home office, one wonders why it bothered to
state the obvious. If, however, it intended by its statement to disallow the deduction upon
a finding that the taxpayer's sole reason for establishment of the home office was simply
to get a deduction, has the court in effect pronounced a new requirement that the taxpayer
must pass?
98. Id. at 826.
99. See note 91 supra.
100. See note 85 supra.
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might also provide a more relaxed atmosphere or pleasant environment that is more conducive to work than the regular office
after hours.10 1 Thus, a home office, except in the case where the
taxpayer's home is very close to the regular office," 2 should rarely
be subject to the convenience restriction. In the majority of cases,
convenience is most properly viewed as simply a factor determining the efficiency of a taxpayer's work in the home office' 013 rather
than the reason for the establishment of the home office in the
first place.

III.

ALLOCATION OF EXPENSES TO THE HOME OFFICE

To arrive at the amount of expenses that are fairly attributable to the business portion of the home," 4 the taxpayer should
calculate a space formula that represents the size of the home
office as a percentage of the entire home.0 5 Revenue Ruling 62180 contemplates that any "reasonable" method of allocation
may be used. 06 One such reasonable method is to compare the
101. The efficiency that will be gained may extend to areas other than the home
office. For example, in Bodzin, the taxpayer was able to make better use of his car pool
because of the establishment of a home office. 60 T.C. 820, 823 (1973).
102. To the chagrin of former President Richard Nixon, a claimed home office deduction that he took with regard to the "San Clemente White House" was disallowed by the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation when his personal federal income tax
returns came under public scrutiny. The convenience restriction was apparently the stumbling block to the deduction's validity in this case.
Beginning in 1969, the Government built an office building complex (costing $1.7 million) which is situated on government property within 300 yards of
the San Clemente residence. This is commonly referred to as the "Western
White House." The President has a personal office in that building and conference rooms are available for staff meetings. Golf carts were purchased by the
Government to transport the President and members of his staff to and from
the office complex.
NIXON's TAXES, supra note 39, at 131.
In view of the proximity of the office complex furnished by the Government to
the President's residence, the staff believes that the home office was maintained
primarily for the personal convenience of the President. Thus, the staff believes
that use of the President's home as an additional office is not "appropriate and
helpful" under the court's standards, but merely duplicates the facilities provided by the Government and, therefore, is maintained by him primarily for his
personal convenience.
Id. at 138.
103. See notes 83, 87 supra.
104. Under the Committee Proposal, supra note 6, allocation would become significantly more complex than it is at the present. See note 159 infra at §.280(f.
105. Rev. Rul. 62-180. See, e.g., James A. Boyajian, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 407 (1970).
106. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 52, 54. However, some rather strange methods
have been used by taxpayers. See, e.g., Walter W. Hendrix, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 221
(1971). The taxpayer in Hendrix maintained a home office in his basement. The basement
had dimensions no larger than thirteen by eighteen feet. The outside dimensions of the
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number of rooms in the home devoted to business purposes with
the total amount of rooms in the home to arrive at the percentage
to be applied to all the expenses.117 Another method commonly

used derives the percentage by a comparison of the square footage
in the home used for business purposes and the total square footage of the home." 8
Often a home office consists of undefined work areas scattered throughout the home.' In such cases it would be most
difficult to compute a space percentage as described above. The
courts allow the taxpayer to approximate the amount of the home
that is devoted to business use in these instances."0 Some have
even gone so far as to allow a home office deduction where the
taxpayer offers no proof as to the extent of the home office."' This
is not a very wise practice for the taxpayer to follow, however, as
case law bears out the point that the less specific a taxpayer's
method of allocation, the more likely the court is to invoke Cohan
2
and make its own, probably less generous, approximation.1
Revenue Ruling 62-180 recognizes that a home office may
exist only part of the time for a taxpayer. That is, the portion of
house were fifty-two by thirty-two feet. The taxpayer claimed a home office expense
calculated on a thirty percent space formula while the Commissioner was only willing to
allow a ten percent formula. The Tax Court applied a fifteen percent formula to the
expenses of the taxpayer's home to arrive at the allowable home office deduction. Obviously, "reasonable" means different things to different people.
107. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cusi. BuLL. 52, 54. See, e.g., Morris S. Schwartz, 30 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1961).

108. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cumi. BuLL. 52, 54. This method yields the most precise
formula. See, e.g., Hoggard v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5805 (E.D. Va. 1967)
(59.12 percent of footage used for business purposes). It is advisable that the taxpayer be
as precise as possible. See the discussion of Cohanin text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
It should be noted that if the taxpayer uses the square footage formula he must
compute a percentage that is based upon the total square of the home rather than one
based upon the total square footage of the home less the total square footage of closets,
halls, boiler rooms or other such parts of a residence that aren't "lived in." See Joseph J.
Imhoff, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 966 (1970).
109. See, e.g., George W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th
Cir., Mar. 21, 1974 (petitioner's work spaces included the dining room and kitchen tables).
110. Id.
111. See Stanley E. Bailey, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 460 (1971) (court allowed deduction as "reasonable in amount") and Walker B. Hough, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 370 (1962)
(deduction allowed upon court's finding that residence was to some extent used for business activities); cf. Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). But see Louis Greenspon,
23 T.C. 138 (1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) ("[Ihe deduction of any expenses
normally considered personal should not be allowed without clear and distinct evidence
that the expenses were for business purposes." 23 T.C. 138, 151 (1954)).
112. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra. Indeed, it is possible that the deduction might be disallowed in its entirety in defiance of Cohan. See Raymond Schott, 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 1648 (1964).
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the home used for business purposes may be used for personal
activities when not used for business." 3 In such instances, the
ruling dictates that the space formula derived to allocate to the
business portion of the home a fair share of the entire home's
expenses must be further modified to include a time dimension."'
The resultant space-time formula that is to be applied to the total
amount of home expenses in order to arrive at the taxpayer's
allowable deduction is a logical extension of the concept that
permits a taxpayer to allocate expenses wherever a facility serves
5
both business and non-business motives."1
The space-time formula is a well accepted method of allocation used by the courts." ' Wherever there is no exclusivity of
business use of a portion of a taxpayer's home, a space-time formula must come into play or else injustice will occur. If, for
instance, the taxpayer works in his bedroom for only two hours
per night, the application of a sterile space formula might allow
a full deduction for a portion of the home which serves a substantially personal motive. Conversely, a formula that fails to account
for the time an office is used might deny a taxpayer a deduction
altogether upon a finding that the portion in question is essentially personal in nature.
Although the space-time formula is currently used in appropriate situations, the time dimension of the formula has not been
well defined." 7 This has caused inconsistent case results blocking
the establishment of a reliable guide that may be used by the
taxpayer. Some of the earlier cases that used the space-time formula employed a rather simplistic analysis to derive the time
dimension of the formula. For example, in CharlesR. Goddard,"8
a rough approximation of the amount of time the office was used
on business matters was made. Thus, a finding that 25 percent
of the space in the home was used for 50 percent of the time
resulted in a space-time formula of 121/2 percent."' An examina113. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. Bu,.. 52, 54, 56.
114. Id. at 54.
115. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.

116. See the discussion of the Henderson, Internationaland Gino cases accompanying notes 120-39 infra.
117. In fact, Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (1958) does not even mention a space-time
formula but, rather, simply states that the taxpayer shall be allowed to deduct as a
business expense the expenses that are "properly attributable" to business use. The spacetime formula is a child of the courts that was baptized by the Commissioner in Revenue
Ruling 62-180.
118. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 419 (1962).
119. Id. at 433.
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tion of how the time dimension was calculated was not presented.
The Goddard court contemplated that the 50 percent figure was
indicative of the home office that was used as much for personal
motives as it was for business motives. Yet, the Goddard court,
in stating that the 50 percent figure represents equal business and
personal use, merely begged the question of what the 50 percent
figure was based upon.
Revenue Ruling 62-180 states that the time dimension of the
space-time formula should be calculated by deriving a ratio that
compares the time the home office is used for business purposes
with the total time it is available for all uses. ' The first case to
apply this formula was Martha E. Henderson."' In that case, the
petitioner used 50 percent of her apartment to conduct her business activities, which consumed approximately 40 hours per
week. The time dimension of petitioner's formula was therefore
122
24 percent.

Henderson illustrates a problem with modifying the space
formula with a time dimension in the case where the home office
is not used exclusively for business purposes. The businessman
whose business premises are not part of his home is allowed to
deduct the full amount of the expenses incurred in running those
premises. On the other hand, the employee who is not provided
with regular office space and is thereby forced to use a portion of
his home as an office, must incorporate a time dimension into the
allocation formula when the business use of a portion of the home
is not exclusive. In most instances it seems fair to require him to
do so." ' But in cases such as Henderson,where the taxpayer uses
his home office for 40 hours-the time generally considered to
be a full work week-the application of a time dimension to the
allocation formula as is required by Revenue Ruling 62-180 arguably results in unjust discrimination. The employee, although devoting as much time to his business as does the larger businessman, is penalized by the time dimension requirement because he
is an employee.2 When the taxpayer does the equivalent of a full
120. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 52, 54, 56.
121. 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 109 (1968).
122. The court arrived at the 24 percent figure by dividing the hours worked in the
home office (40) by the number of hours in a week (7 x 24 = 168).
123. The general theory of allocation between personal and business use demands
allocation wherever both substantial business and personal motives exist. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
124. See Wolfman, Professorsand the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 1089 (1964), wherein Dean Wolfman, in commenting upon the Service's
initial denial of a college professor's claimed research expenditure deduction (Harold H.
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week's work in a home office, the notion of watering down the
space formula with a time adjustment seems unfair. 2 '
The first case to deal with the question of what should be the
proper time dimension where a time dimension was a necessary
element of the allocation formula was International Artists,
Ltd.1 21 The home office in that case was used about 20 percent
of the days in the year. The Commissioner, following Revenue
Ruling 62-180 and Henderson, determined that 20 percent
was the applicable time dimension to be used in deriving the
space-time allocation formula. The figure was arrived at by
comparing the days of business use of the home to the days the
home was available for all uses. The court did not accept the
Commissioner's position that the time dimension should be calculated on the basis of the office's availabilityfor use and instead
127
held that it should be decided on the basis of its actualuse. The

court allowed the petitioner a more generous home office expense
deduction than the Commissioner had allowed based upon that
r
reasoning. '2
Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962), vacated by stipulationand remanded, No. 18188, 9th Cir., Jan.
3, 1964), stated:
[tihe patent discrimination between the self-employed and the employed was
ignored. Although a self-employed individual was ordinarily trusted to judge
what was helpful and appropriate to his business, and his discretionary, business related expenses were deductible, the only safeguard deemed sufficient to
the protection of the public fisc in the case of an employed person was the
compelling mandate of his employer.
Id. at 1101 (footnote omitted). See also Crumbly, supra note 53; 47 INDIANA L.J. 546, 548.
50 (1971); note 156 infra.
125. A problem arises here with respect to fixing a full week's work cut-off point above
which a time dimension is not used and below which one is used. A taxpayer falling below
the cut-off point by only one hour or so is subject to the full time dimension restriction,
whereas the taxpayer who uses his home office only one hour more need only apply the
greater deduction generating space formula. Of course, some sort of sliding time dimension
factor that would decrease as the use of the home office increased might be developed to
solve this problem.
In any event, this entire problem might be sidestepped by the application of the "total
use" concept discussed and refined in Internationaland Gino. See notes 126-39 infra and
accompanying text.
126. 55 T.C. 94 (1970).
127. The court did not break new ground with the "actual use" test. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.274-2(e)(4)(1963), which is addressed to the problem of determination of an entertainment facility's primary purpose and states that" . . it is the actual use of the facility
which establishes the deductibility of expenditures with respect to the facility, not its
availability for use ......
128. The Commissioner allowed a space-time formula of 1/6 x 20 percent or 1/30.
International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94, 106 (1970). The court allowed a 50 percent deduction. Id. at 107.
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Yet the Internationalcourt, while rejecting part of Revenue
Ruling 62-180 and setting up an actual use standard, avoided the
question of what it meant by the term "actual use." The 50
percent figure the court found to be based upon petitioner's actual use of the home is of negligible precedential value as the
method of calculation of that time dimension was not described
in the International opinion." 9 The International court did not
deal with the question of how to compute a time dimension. It
did not define "actual use."
The Tax Court finally came to grips with interpreting actual
use in George W. Gino.' The petitioners were school teachers
who used scattered portions of their various residences "a couple
of hours a night"'131 to prepare for class. The Commissioner's contention that the time dimension should be calculated by comparing the hours of business use to the hours available for all uses
was rejected. 3 The court held that "the proper ratio to apply is
"13 The Gino
the ratio of business use to hours of total use ..
court used the term "total use" in the same way the International
court used "actual use"-that is, to reduce the sphere of reference
from the time a facility is available for all uses to the more limited
sphere defined by the time the facility is being taken advantage
of and not just simply held or potentially usable.
Unlike the court in International,the Gino court attempted
to specifically define the notion of total use. As its counterpart
in International did, the Gino court rejected the portion of
Revenue Ruling 62-180 calling for an allocation ratio based upon
the home office's availability for all uses. 134 The Gino court defined total use as eight hours per day for the petitioners. 35 That
figure was arrived at by taking the total amount of the time spent
in the apartment by the petitioners (sixteen hours per day) and
129. The court said simply "that the dual use of [the home] for business and nonbusiness related purposes requires an equal allocation of the expenses and depreciation
incurred in connection with [the home]. Thus 50 percent of the expenses and depreciation are deductible . . . ." Id. at 107.
130. 60 T.C. 304 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 21, 1974.
131. Id. at 315.
132. The reason for the non-acceptance of the Commissioner's contention was that a
time dimension that represented business use to total availability for use was based on
"[T]he erroneous and distorting assumption that a dual-use facility is not, when unused,
just as much available for business use as it is for nonbusiness use." Id.
133. Id. at 314.
134. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 52, 54, 56.
135. The court determined that "the 'work areas' were actually in use not more than
some 8 hours a day." 60 T.C. 304, 315 (1973).
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subtracting sleeping time (eight hours per day). Thus, since the
petitioner used the home office two hours per night, the appropriate time dimension of the space-time formula was 2/8 and not
2/24, as the Commissioner argued it should be.13 The court's
definition of total use as eight hours was constructed upon the
assumption that during both the eight hour sleep and work periods, the home office was not being used. Although the home
served substantially personal motives during those times, the
motives must be couched in terms of availability for use rather
than actual use if the reasoning of Internationaland Gino is to
1 37
be consistent.
Gino advanced Internationalby requiring that the concept of
total or actual use must be decided upon a critical evaluation of
how the various periods of the day are spent by the taxpayer.
Gino, however, did not advance Internationalto the point where
the taxpayer is now able to apply a fixed time dimension with a
common denominator of eight hours to every home office case. 3 '
Nor does it presume to do so. Determinations of the amount of
time spent must be an individual case by case undertaking. Allowances must be made for holidays, vacations, weekends and
other factors tending to appreciably affect the actual time spent
at home. Gino does not require the taxpayer to arrive at a total
136. In Gino, the home office was not comprised of the petitioners' bedrooms. If,
however, part of the schoolteachers' work spilled over into a portion of their bedroom an
argument could well be made that the denominator of the time dimension should have
been 16 rather than 8 or 24 since the bedroom which doubled as a part of the home office
was "used" during the eight hour period. It is possible that Gino might persuade taxpayers
to make sure that their home offices are not part of their bedrooms, lest their deduction
be smaller than it has to be. The fairness of increasing the denominator to 16 or even 24
(in the cases where the taxpayer may live in a one room efficiency apartment) is certainly
questionable. This might be considered to be a form of discrimination against the employee. See note 163 infra.
Along the same line, the recommended legislation of the House Ways and Means
Committee would codify the discrimination against the employee who is unable to set
aside an area of his residence which will be exclusively used for business purposes. See
note 159 infra at § 280 (c)(1).
137. A finding that the home was actually used during these periods would necessitate that these periods be included in the calculation of a time dimension even if the use
was exclusively personal. That is, to say that the home was used during those periods,
albeit for personal purposes, would be inconsistent with saying that it was not used at all.
Therefore, by not including those periods, it must be assumed that the Gino court determined that during the two eight hour periods in question, the home office was only
potentially available for use and therefore beyond the sphere of actual use; thus, the two
eight hour periods in point were not included in the denominator of the dimension. See
note 136 supra.
138. The court made this clear when it distinguished Henderson from Gino. 60 T.C.
304, 315 n.5 (1973).
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use figure that is exactly in harmony with reality." 9 Indeed, the
lack of conformity in many of our lives probably precludes us
from doing so. The message of Gino is clear: the taxpayer must
at least attempt a period-of-the-day break-down analysis in order
that he may calculate a time dimension that is reasonable for his
unique set of circumstances.
IV.

THE

LEGACY OF

Bodzin & Gino

Several problems are raised by Bodzin. The "appropriate
and helpful" standard that is established is extremely low and,
as a result, revenues to the government should decline as the
number of taxpayers that will qualify for the home office expense
deduction increases. 4 ' Although the amount of the claimed deduction in Bodzin was relatively small,' it may prove to represent only the "nose of the camel"'4 - in this area.
In addition to a drop in revenues, significant administrative
burdens may be created for the Internal Revenue Service. As the
deduction increases in its incidence, more taxpayers than had
previously done so might itemize their deductions, finding that
139. The court stated: "We recognize that allocations of this type are necessarily
imprecise, but they are required if justice is to be served." Id. at 315.
140. Under the holding of the majority opinion, there would certainly be
no professional person, and very few if any business people, who would not be
entitled to deduct as a business expense some portion of the cost of rental of a
home or the maintenance of a house since the great majority of such persons do
professional reading and written work for themselves or their employers in their
homes. In fact, this is probably true of the majority of persons interested in their
work regardless of the type of work they do unless their work is purely mechanical in nature.
Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 827 (1973) (Scott, J., dissenting). This bothers the
government and it intends to try to do something about it.
Because the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York upheld the Tax
Court in an earlier case [New,], the Treasury has been-and is widely expected
to continue-appealing all such cases to other courts in the hope of finding one
to back its view and, thus, create a situation where one appeals court disagrees
with another.
Then the I.R.S. would be free to take the question for adjudication to the
Supreme Court.
In the meantime, in the opinion of one attorney involved in the issue, the
Service will definitely scrutinize these deductions and, if you are audited, will
definitely make you prove them. "They want to put a stop to it because it's
draining their revenues and they know it," he said, "So you better be able to
prove that you work at home."
Cole, Tax-Court Rulings Make Deductions For Home Offices Easier To Obtain, N.Y.
Times, April 4, 1974, at 61, col. 6, 62, col. 3 (city ed.).
141. See note 73 supra.
142. 60 T.C. 820, 828 (1973) (Quealy, J., dissenting).
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this "extra" deduction now makes itemization advantageous.143
143. Thus, the Bodzin standard may have a "tipping effect," fostering taxpayer
itemization. An earlier commentator forecasted the same result in examining the relaxation of the allowance standard brought about by Newi. Cf. 47 INIANA L.J. 546, 556 n.64
(1971). Although there are no available statistics as yet to check the accuracy of that
prediction, it seems likely that the prediction was a good one.
A similar prediction with regard to Bodzin seem reasonable, especially with the deduction's "fattening" after Gino. An illustration is called for to demonstrate Bodzin's
possible effect in this area. Assume the following for a single taxpayer, claiming only one
personal exemption, who computes his tax liability under § l(c) of the Code:
$15,000
Adjusted gross income
2,000
Standard deduction taken in lieu
of $1,500 deductible expenses
Personal exemption
750
2,750
Total deductions
$12,250
Taxable Income
$2,702.50
Tax liability
Further assume that Bodzin now makes the taxpayer eligible for a home office expense
deduction. The taxpayer uses one room of a four room apartment, three hours per night
to do work-related reading. He is out of the apartment eight hours per day (at work) and
sleeps eight hours. The expenses of running the entire apartment (including rent, telephone, heat, electricity and cleaning) total $500 per month. The taxpayer would be allowed a home office expense deduction computed as follows:
$500/4 = $125
Expense of running portion of
home devoted to business use for
one month
3/8 x $125 = $46.88
Expense of running home office
for one month-incorporates required
(Gino) time adjustment to reflect
business use of the area
12 x $46.88 = $562.56
Home office expense for 12 months
The taxpayer, who can now avail himself of this "extra" deduction, would now itemize
total expenses of $2,062.50 ($1,500 + $562.50), which are greater than the standard deduction of $2,000.
It should be noted that in instances where the "tipping" phenomenon occurs, the
increase in the total amount of deduction claimed will be less than the home office expense
itself and, consequently, the reduction in revenue to the government will be somewhat less
than would likely appear to be the case upon cursory analysis. In our example, the increase
in deduction that will be taken by the taxpayer will be $62.56 ($2,062.56 - $2,000). Thus,
the loss in revenue to the government when the taxpayer itemizes is only $18.14 computed
as follows:
$15,000.00
$1,500.00
562.56
750.00
2,812.56
$12,187.44
2,684.36

Adjusted gross income
Other expenses that were
not itemzed before Bodzin
Home office expense
Personal exemption
Total deductions
Taxable income
Tax liability
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Since itemized returns are more cumbersome to process than
returns where the standard deduction is elected,' a forecast of
an increased administrative workload does not seem unreasonable. Furthermore, the Bodzin standard is so low that many taxpayers who do not really deserve the deduction may be tempted
to seek it. The Service would thus be saddled with the unpleasant
vtask of individually scrutinizing home office deductions taken by
taxpayers in order to weed out fraudulent and invalid claims.
This would undoubtedly be time consuming and costly.
Another problem posed by Bodzin is caused by the vagueness
of its "appropriate and helpful" standard. The inherent subjectivity of that term may make the home office deduction's ultimate allowance a function of either the reviewing Internal Revenue Service agent's conception of the "appropriate and helpful"
standard as applied to the particular set of facts at hand or,
frighteningly, his caprice.' Hopefully, the danger of the taxpayer
being entirely at the mercy of a reviewing agent will be somewhat
lessened by the addition of an element of reason with which, after
Bodzin, an agent must temper his concept of the term "appropriate and helpful."
The examination of the validity of the home office deduction
should, apparently, now focus on whether the claimed deduction
seems reasonable in terms of its relationship to the taxpayer's role
as an employee in a particular field.' The element of reason
injected into the "appropriate and helpful" standard by Bodzin
should help to ensure, more so than before, that an agent's actions will better follow the spirit of §162, which is to allow as
deductions for every taxpayer "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses . . of carrying on a trade or business.' 14 7 The criterion
of allowance before Bodzin could have conceivably resulted in a
$2,702.50 (tax liability before itemization) - $2,684.36 (tax liability with itemization) =
$18.14.
144. 47 INDIANA L.J. 546, 556 (1971).
145. See Paul J. O'Connell, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEm.DEC. 74,128 (May 14, 1974).
146. This is the standard for allowance under § 212 of the Code. See Treas. Reg. §
1.212-1(d)(1957). The application of this concept to the home office area is logical. As one
commentator points out:
[It can be argued that the maintenance of a home office is very closely related
to the taxpayer's employee-business. The work done in the home office is similar
to the work done during regular business hours, or is work which is closely
related to the taxpayer's occupation. . ..
42 U. CN. L. Ray. 741, 748-49 (1973). "Reasonableness," however, has no place in the
House Ways and Means Committee proposal for legislative reform. See note 159 infra at

§ 280(b)-(c).
147. Tr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
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denial to a taxpayer of the deduction upon a determination that
the work carried on at the home office, although bearing a reasonable relationship to his employee duties, did not clearly prove
"helpful." Bodzin's flavoring of the "appropriate and helpful".
standard with reason now shifts the emphasis away from the
expense's ultimate helpfulness' to the employee's business, with
the probable result of allowing almost all home office expenses as
deductions that are well intentioned and legitimately incurred in
the hope of furthering business ends.' Section 162, by its very
nature, -exists to encourage taxpayer productivity; it allows all
valid business expenses as deductions. The Bodzin standard
places the home office deduction squarely within that section's
scope.
Although a more rigid and cognizable criterion than "appropriate and helpful" would perhaps be more comforting to the taxpayer and the Service, an inflexible standard would surely have
the effect of occasionally precluding the deduction where legitimate business expenses were incurred. Thus a subjective standard would seem preferable to any sort of inflexible standard such
as the now defunct "condition of employment" test."'
Yet the fact remains that utilization of the Bodzin standard
will necessitate individualized administrative attention to keep a
hold or the reins in this area. The question of whether the home
office deduction has been brought into the realm of administrative infeasibility by Bodzin is very real. The likely increase in
costs to the Service that should flow from an attempt to stop
fraudulent claims, coupled with a probable increased incidence
of itemized returns, will be imposing.
An argument in favor of the abolition of the deduction in the
148. This shift is consistent with a recent move made in another § 162 area. The
deduction of employment agency fees as ordinary and necessary business expenses used
to turn upon whether a job was obtained as a result of the expenditure. Rev. Rul. 233,
1960-1 CuM. BULL. 57, as interpreted by Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969). Now, an
employee who engages the services of an employment agency to obtain employment may
deduct the agency's fees as § 162 expenses regardless of whether the agency is successful
in securing employment for its client. See Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219 (1972), noted
in, 51 N. CAROLNA L. REv. 154 (1972). This would appear to be the proper trend. The
disallowance of expenses because of the absence of a realized benefit bears an illogical
relation to § 162.
149. Of course, the taxpayer must be able to prove that the work carried on in the
home office was not "incidental." See text accompanying notes 67-75 supra. Additionally,
the home office may not be established solely for the taxpayer's convenience. See text
accompanying notes 97-103 supra. The issue of convenience will necessitate a factual
inquiry with each home office case. 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 741, 749 (1973).
150. Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 52.
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name of administrative simplicity and streamlining appears attractive at first blush. Yet, upon analysis of counterbalancing
considerations, the case for abolishing the deduction becomes
significantly less compelling. If the deduction were abolished
while taxpayers incurred home office expenses, the effect would
be to categorize the home office expense as one that is not a trade
or business expense within the meaning of § 162.151 But clearly,
when a home office is maintained, expenses are incurred which
are more appropriately viewed as business expenses rather than
personal ones.' 52 Furthermore, taxpayers might decide to cease
working at home, knowing they will receive no tangible benefit
from so doing; taxpayer productivity could decrease. Thus the
abolition of the deduction would go far to undercut the statutory
intent of § 162.
The abolition of the home office deduction does not seem
warranted for yet another, perhaps greater, reason. There now
exists in our tax system a certain discrimination against employees and in favor of employers. Only some of the employee's business expenses are deductible from gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income,' 3 whereas all of an employer's business expenses are allowed as deductions from gross income. 5 -In addition, a self-employed taxpayer is allowed to deduct all home office
expenses from gross income in computing adjusted gross income;
he is afforded the status of an employer.1 15 It then follows that the
employee is discriminated against because he is an employee.' 0
151. The cost of subscribing to a taxpayer's work related journals are deductible
expenses under § 162. Irving L. Shein, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 170 (1952). Thus, the
abolition of the home office expense deduction would create the absurd situation in which
the taxpayer would claim such subscription costs but would be denied a deduction for, in
essence, reading the material.
152. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3)(1958).
153. These are:
1) Reimbursed expenses - INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62(2)(A);
2) Expenses for travel away from home - INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 62(2)(B);
3) Transportation expenses - INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62(2)(C); and
4)

Outside salesman expenses - INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 62(2)(D).

154. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 62(1).
155. This has been the case for quite some time. Verner S. Gaggin, 3 B.T.A. 19 (1925).
156. Absent statutory mandates, it is not at all clear why a taxpayer's right to certain
deductions should be conditioned on his employee or self-employed status.
[It is important to lay at rest any possible argument that petitioner's right to
deduction must be denied because he was an employee rather than one who was
self-employed. There is nothing in the law establishingany such distinction. If
the expenses are "ordinary and necessary," proximately related to the taxpayer's work they are deductible.
Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175, 186-87 (1962), vacated by stipulationand remanded, No.
18188, 9th Cir., Jan. 3, 1964 (emphasis added) (Raum, J., dissenting). See note 124 supra.
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The abolition of the home office deduction would further penalize
the employee because of his status. The case for abolition on the
ground of simplifying the administrative process seems unconvincing when viewed against the backdrop of discrimination
based upon one's economic status. Therefore, the Bodzin court
was justified in effecting a significant relaxation of the criterion
for the allowance of the home office deduction.
In the same vein, the Gino court made the proper move in
adopting a more realistic and liberal actual use standard to be
used when computing a home office expense deduction. The
actual use standard articulated, based on a period-of-the-day
breakdown analysis, more precisely reflects the "use" of a facility
than did either the undefined actual use standard of
Internationalor its predecessor, the availability for use standard.1 57 Availability is a concept measured by potentiality,
whereas the critical actual use standard of Gino, is a more reasoned standard based upon the unique circumstances of individual taxpayers. The Gino standard brings the taxpayer-employee
closer to equality with the businessman who rents or owns business property and whose respective rental and depreciation expense deductions are unquestionably rooted in an actual use
analysis.' 8 The employee may now claim a greater home office
deduction than had heretofore been possible. The deduction is no
longer one that is almost entirely watered down by a discriminatory time element.
Not unlike the holding in Bodzin, however, the Gino holding
should increase the Service's workload. Although the actual use
standard is an approximation that must be arrived at by analyzing how the various periods of a taxpayer's workday are spent, the
resultant time element of the space-time allocation formula undoubtedly also incorporates a mysterious input of the taxpayer
which reflects the maximum amount of the deduction he feels can
be claimed without arousing the suspicion of the Service. Since
Gino increases the potential amount of the deduction for most
taxpayers, more is now at stake for the Internal Revenue Service.
It may well be forced to scrutinize a greater number of claimed
157. See notes 120-39 supra and accompanying text.

158. The businessman is allowed a 100 percent deduction for rental and depreciation
expenses even though the business might be in operation only eight hours a day. Since
the business property is devoted exclusively to business ends, the fiction is created that

it is "actually used" twenty-four hours a day. Therefore, Gino properly extends this
"actual use" fiction to the employee who does not enjoy the luxury of possessing property
that may be exclusively devoted to business.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss1/3

26

Berns: The Home Office Deduction: Administrative Complexity versus Taxpa

Home Office Deduction
home office deductions in order to guard against unreasonable
approximations made by well-intentioned taxpayers, and outrageous approximations made by the overly zealous.
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, it seems likely that Bodzin and Gino
will be spurs to an increased administrative workload. Bodzin
should increase the workload because the inherent subjectivity of
the "appropriate and helpful" standard will increase borderline
cases of allowance which demand administrative attention. Furthermore, the increased incidence of the deduction after Bodzin
could have the effect of increasing the ranks of taxpayers who
itemize. Likewise, Gino should increase the workload, because
the actual use standard increases the potential size of the deduction. As a consequence, the Service will probably have to intensify its hunt for abuses of the standard's application in order to
keep revenues from shrinking.
Yet the swelling of the Service's workload should be tolerated
because of the counterbalancing equitable principles embodied
by Bodzin and Gino. Contemplated legislative action that would
essentially deny the effects of these cases is not warranted.159
Bodzin has placed the home office deduction on an equal footing
159. A tentative draft of legislation prepared by the House Ways and Means Committee would add a new Code section, selected portions of which follow:
Sec. 280. Disallowance of Certain Expenses in Connection with Business Use of
Home, Rental of Vacation Homes, Etc.
(a) General Rule - Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case
of a taxpayer who is an individual or an electing small business corporation, no
deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed with respect
to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable
year as a residence.
(c)

Exception for Certain Business Use (1) In general . - Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the
extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which
is exclusively used on a regular basis as (A) the taxpayer's principal place of business, or
(B) a place of business which is used by patients, clients, of
customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business. In the case of an employee,
the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use
referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of
his employer.
(2) Certain Home Industries.-In the case of any trade or business
of a kind customarily carried on in the home as a sole proprietorship,
if the home is the principal place of business and if the activites
conducted outside the home are merely incidental to the conduct of
such business -
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with all other legitimate business,deductions, as it should always
have been; 6 ' the taxpayer need only prove that he engages in
(A) paragraph (1) shall be applied without regard to the requirement of exclusive use but
(B) the deductions directly related to the use of the dwelling
unit which are allowable under this chapter for the taxable year
by reason of their being attributable to such trAde or business
shall not exceed an amount equal to the excess (if any) of(i) the gross income derived from such trade or business during such taxable year, over
(ii) the sum of the deductions allocable to such trade
or business which are allowable under this chapter for
the taxable year whether or not the taxpayer was engaged in such trade or business and the deductions
which are allowable under this chapter for the taxable
year by reason of their being attributable to such trade
or business and which are not directly related to the use
of the dwelling unit.
(d) Rental Deductions Allowed Only to Extent of Rental Income.- In the case
of any dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a
residence, subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is
attributable to the rental of the dwelling unit or portion thereof (determined
after the application of subsection (f)), but the deductions allowable under this
chapter for the taxable year by reason of their being attributable to such rental
shall not exceed the excess of(1) the gross income derived from such rental for the taxable year,
over
(2) the deductions allocable to such rental which are allowable under
this chapter for the taxable year whether or not such unit (or portion
thereof) was rented.
(e) Use As Residence.(1) In General.-For purposes of this section, a taxpayer uses a
dwelling unit during the taxable year as a residence if he uses such
unit (or a portion thereof) for personal purposes for a number of days
which exceeds the greater of
(A) 7 days, or
(B) 5 percent of the number of days during such year for
which such unit is rented at a fair rental.
(f) Allocation of Expenses.-In any case where a taxpayer who is an individual
or an electing small business corporation uses a dwelling unit for personal purposes on any day during the taxable year, the amount deductible under this
chapter with respect to expenses attributable to the rental of the unit or portion
thereof (whether or not subsection (d) applies to such rental) for the taxable year
shall not exceed an amount which bears the same relationship to such expenses
as the number of days the unit or portion thereof is rented at a fair rental value
for such year bears to the total number of days during such year that the unit
or portion thereof is used. This subsection shall not apply with respect to deductions which would be allowable under this chapter for the taxable year whether
or not such unit or portion thereof was rented.
160. The point that the home office deduction should always have been treated like
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employment-related work at home in order to claim a home office
expense deduction.16" ' Gino's actual use standard has taken the
legitimate deduction from one that had an undeserved status of
virtual tokenism and given it a deserved maturity by increasing
its potential amount.
The principles of these cases should be codified by either
Congress or the Treasury Department16 to ensure that the home
office deduction's new status will be given the type of recognition
that all deductions should enjoy. Codification might also have the
beneficial effect of making the deduction somewhat more uniform
any other deduction is not without its critics. Professor Halperin, in a recent article,
Uniform Approach, supra note 14, argues for a re-thinking through of the problems associated with business deductions for things which arguably are personal in nature. Addressing himself specifically to the home office, Professor Halperin proposes that ". . .because
of the very real doubt as to the benefit . . . " of a home office, the significant personal
satisfaction realized from the area in use, and the fact that the home office "expense" is
an expense that would otherwise be incurred by the taxpayer (id. at 914), in cases where
the primary purpose in acquiring the space is personal, a deduction should be totally
denied. In instances where the primary purpose of acquisition is business, he would resurrect the actual business use to total availability for use ratio of Revenue Ruling 62-180.
Furthermore, where personal use of a business portion of the home is significant, Professor
Halperin would not seem to be uncomfortable with total disallowance of a deduction. Id.
at 915.
Professor Halperin's underlying assumption of the doubt as to the benefit of working
at home is, at the very least, questionable. Also, his apparent desire for a finding of
taxpayer intent vis a vis the acquisition of a home office would demand a potentially
cumbersome administrative determination on a case by case basis.
But, even beyond this, his proposal does not seem true to the spirit of § 162, which
does not mention taxpayer intent. But see note 93 supra wherein Judge Quealy's dissent
in Bodzin is analyzed. Actual expenditures reflective of actual use of a facility more closely
follows § 162. Thus, adherence to Revenue Ruling 62-180's time allocation ratio would not
be justified. Similarly, denying a deduction upon a finding of significant personal use of
an area, irrespective of primary business use, is not warranted.
Finally, although basing a substantial part of his analysis on the terms "significant"
and "insignificant," Professor Halperin fails to give any guidance as to how these terms
are to be gauged. The case-law-derived "regular" requirement (see notes 67-75 supra, and
accompanying text) should apparently be discarded and in its place Professor Halperin
envisions a "significance" standard being used. What is "significant" would require an
individual factual inquiry; the prospects for this new suggested inquiry inviting administrative problems and, ultimately, litigation are great.
161. See note 149 supra.
162. Probably the most useful type of codification would be in the form of either
a new Revenue Ruling or Treasury Regulation which sets forth numerous examples illustrating valid as well as invalid home office deductions. The area does
not easily lend itself to a two or three paragraph capsule of the law. Something
of a "feel" for the relevant considerations should be sought by the taxpayer in
order to decrease the likelihood of an error which could lead to the unpleasant
experience of an audit. Well explained examples seem to offer the greatest hope
for the taxpayer to grasp the relevant principles involved.
For an earlier, unsuccessful attempt by Congress to alter the nature of the deduction
see U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Proposalsfor Tax Change 111 (1973).
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in its application and, therefore, might subsequently hold down
the increased administrative burden that Bodzin and Gino portend. However, even if codification does not have such a moderating effect on the Service's increased workload, and the cries of
decreased revenues and administrative infeasibility are heard,
the deduction should nevertheless be considered a basic right of
every employee who works at home that -should not be compromised. Expediency is a lame excuse for sacrificing equity." 3"
Michael H. Berns
163. Not surprisingly, this view is not embraced by the House Ways and Means
Committee. See note 159 supra. The Committee Proposal would clearly penalize the
taxpayer who cannot devote, on an exclusive basis, a portion of his dwelling to his work.
See Committee Proposal, supra note 159 at § 280(c)(1) and note 136 supra.
Apparently, the exclusive use criterion was incorporated into the Committee Proposal
in an effort to render the deduction less vulnerable to taxpayer abuses. Although wellintentioned, the Committee might have overreacted. The Committee Proposal would
mandate that a taxpayer be denied a deduction if there exists in one's home only minimal
personal use of the business portion. Analogously, consider whether a business should be
denied a business expense deduction for office rental if an executive occasionally sleeps
overnight at the office.
The Committee Proposal would also obfuscate the appropriate and helpful requirement as developed and refined by years of litigation. In its place would be the requirement
that the work done at home is done "for the convenience of [the] employer." See note
159 supra" at § 280(c)(B). If the intent of switching standards is to make the applicable
criterion more readily cognizable, the Committee has again missed the mark. The "convenience" language echoes the ambiguous Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (1956) where the cost of
an employee's employer-furnished meals vis a vis inclusion in the employee's gross income
is in question. See Rev. Rul. 411, 1971-2 CuM. BuLL. 103. The "convenience" test is apt
to be as subjective as an appropriate and helpful determination, and probably not as
reflective of the "ordinary and necessary" requirement of the Code upon which the stan.
dard is grounded. In fact, it is quite probable that the "convenience" test would increase
both the flow of litigation surrounding this area and the level of administrative problems
as taxpayers, the Service and the courts attempt to develop the meaning of this concept
in a new context.
* The Bodzin appeal was argued on December 2, 1974.
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